INSTRUCTOR DISCUSSION NOTES:
Society Would Be Better Off if Everyone Played Cooperatively and Got a Flu Shot

1. Why don't individuals move in a non-cooperative game from an individual optimum to the social optimum?

While there may be a group incentive to move individuals, there is no unilateral incentive for any one individual to move there.

2. Suppose an instructor in a class grades on a curve (i.e., 10% receive an A, 20% a B, and so on). Can cheating by students on an exam be considered a Nash equilibrium in that situation? Why or why not?

Potentially, depending on the probability of getting caught, etc. The main point is that if one individual cheats, s/he has an advantage over all others. That forces other students to cheat as well. No individual has an incentive to not cheat when all others are cheating.

3. Consider the vaccination example. Is there a way to move individuals to the cooperative outcome, in which a critical mass of people receive vaccinations? How could this occur?

The government could subsidize vaccinations, which reduces the cost of the vaccination, increasing net benefit. Individuals must be given a reason to move away from that non-cooperative outcome.

Multiple Choice/True False Questions

1. What economic concept best explains the reason for the difference between the socially optimal number of people vaccinated, and the individually optimal number?
  1. External benefits
  2. Sunk costs
  3. Opportunity costs
  4. Long-run variable costs
ANS . a

2. True/False. In a Nash equilibrium, a superior alternative exists, but no individual has a reason to move in that direction.
ANS . True

3. Consider the following scenario. Two companies are deciding on price of its product. If each company charges $30, each firm will earn $10 million in profit. If each company charges $40, each firm will earn $20 million in profit. However, if one firm charges $40, while the other charges $30, the lower-priced firm will earn $45 million in profit, while the higher-priced firm will only earn $15 million. What is the Nash equilibrium price in this scenario?
  1. Both charge $30
  2. Both charge $40
  3. One charges $30, the other charges $40
  4. None of the above.
ANS . a

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